Brian Weatherson has a post on a new signalling mechanism apparently implemented by the American Economic Association. It sounds like job candidates are now allowed to “signal” to two departments they are applying to that they are seriously interested in the job. This might help candidates that miight be considered “too good” for a department to be seriously considered.
Sounds like a great idea to me.
Incidentally, I have become a member of the APA Committee on Career Opportunities and Placement as of last summer. I would think that such a committee would be the appropriate place to discuss this kind of “signalling” initiative. But since becoming a member, I have received no communication on what the committee is doing and what is expected of me. I emailed the chair several weeks ago and got no response. Is this normal? Does anyone know how this APA Committee works, whether it’s engaged any activities, and if so, how members are supposed to participate in the committee’s activities?
Signalling on the Job Market and APA Committees
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On the idea of being allowed to signal: as far as I know nothing disallows candidates in philosophy from doing this. I’ve seen it done in both directions: a candidate signalling a department (ususally through an intermediary, like the candidate’s university’s placement officer) serious interest in the department’s job, and the department signalling a candidate (ditto) attempting to learn whether the candidate would be interested in the job.
If there’s reason to think that participants in the job market think they shouldn’t do this, then perhaps the APA might take a stance on it.