By Gloria Andrada, Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
(See all the posts in this series here.)
One of my favorite things about Vierkant’s book is that it provides an original argument for extended cognition, one that begins with the role of intentional action in epistemic agency. This makes it really interesting for people working on 4E cognition as it connects extended cognition with key debates on epistemic agency and free will. And it is also illuminating for those working directly on these issues too. So I want to begin this commentary by praising Vierkant for his work bridging an important gap and contributing to a stimulating conversation!
A central goal in The Tinkering Mind is to establish what role intentional action plays in human epistemic agency. The rationale behind Vierkant’s argument can be summarized in two dilemmas. The first one concerns the state of the art on epistemic agency (prior to Vierkant’s book):
I. Either epistemic agency (i.e., the acquisition of doxastic states) is passive (Strawson-style) or it is a non-intentional form of agency (Hieronymi-style).
In other words, either there are no genuine intentional mental actions (Strawson), or epistemic agency is deflationary (Hieronymi). This latter option entails that intentional mental actions are mere “tinkerings” or forms of managerial control (following Hieronymi’s terminology). In contrast, epistemic agency is a form of non-intentional evaluative control (again following Hieronymi’s terminology).
The second dilemma is the following:
II. Either we accept that epistemic agency is simply non-intentional (something along the lines of Hieronimy’s notion of evaluative control) or we commit to extended cognition.
According to Vierkant, intentional mental actions are managerial, i.e., they indirectly contribute to doxastic acquisition. In his view, this is the only way of holding that system two processes are intentional while at the same time maintaining a form of doxastic involuntarism, roughly, the idea that we cannot believe at will (since beliefs ultimately follow evidence).
Interestingly, Vierkant claims that once we accept that intentional mental actions are not directly responsible for the acquisition of new doxastic states (in other words, never directly evaluative by themselves), then, one should be inclined to accept the truth of extended cognition, i.e., that there are mental actions that are environment involving.
But why?
Well, intentional mental actions are, as we just saw, tinkerings. And, in this sense, they are very similar to some intentional actions that are environment-involving but still influence our cognitive behavior (e.g., epistemic actions).
So, this appreciation combined with parity principle-style arguments for the extended mind —according to which sufficient functional similarity should undermine any bio-prejudice we might have concerning the location of genuine cognitive processes and states— makes it the case that intentional mental actions can be “inside the head” or environment-involving.
I want to press Vierkant on the direct/indirect distinction which, as we have just seen, makes it possible to hold on to a non-deflationary view of epistemic agency.
In the book, the directness of cognitive evaluation is sometimes articulated as simply the claim that “there is no extra step needed”. Beliefs are updated directly in virtue of evidence intake, without the need to do something else. On the other hand, intentional mental actions can only indirectly affect doxastic states.
But why is the direct/indirect distinction so relevant?
One could think that it is simply a phenomenological difference. Ultimately evaluation is experienced as happening automatically or beyond our conscious reach. But this is compatible with there being nothing genuinely different between indirect tinkerings and direct evaluations, beyond the fact that the evaluation takes place in the final step of a causal chain. This makes sense if we regard cognition as a kind of computation.
Also in the book, Vierkant writes about tinkerings that take the form of a conditioning process to change doxastic states as being rather slow. This contrasts with the quick nature of non-intentional cognitive evaluation. So, perhaps, the directness of cognitive evaluation could be a matter of bandwidth and computational speed.
If that is so, doesn’t the centrality of the direct/indirect distinction wither away?
I would like to hear Vierkant’s ideas on the matter. And, in particular, it would be interesting to further articulate the relevance of the phenomenology of direct and indirect control, given the role such a distinction plays in his argument, namely, distinguishing between cognitive evaluation and intentional mental actions.
Now, and following from this, I’m interested in seeing how far is Vierkant willing to concede to the extended cognition picture of the mind, given his self-ascribed sympathies for it.
Upon some reflection, it seems to me that if we take seriously the central claim of extended cognition, one could argue that it seems like a bit of a missed opportunity to simply leave a managerial role to the extended bits of our cognition.
Once again, its managerial role is partly grounded on its mere indirect influence of doxastic acquisition. But I wonder what would happen if we think about it differently. Of course, downplaying the direct aspect of cognitive evaluation could open the door for a form of doxastic voluntarism. But still it could be claimed that talk about extended cognition being “indirect” has a bit of an internalistic flavor, as there is an unextended core of genuine cognition and direct epistemic agency. Even if this isn’t problematic per se, I want to take this opportunity to invite Vierkant to let us know a bit more about his commitment to the extended cognition picture of the human mind, and his understanding of it.
Finally, I want to point out that this could also have implications for our view of will-power, and for how we value indirect exercises of the will. In the second part of the book, Vierkant distinguishes between exercises of self-control by willpower —when an agent directly controls the urge to give in to a bad desire with their mind—, from self-control by tinkering with the environment, which in turn prevents the bad decision or the bad consequences.
But why should extended forms of self-control be considered indirect if ultimately they are forms of cognitive control? Why insist on their indirect nature?
My worry is that by holding on to a direct/indirect distinction we are holding on to a (potentially incorrect) traditional view on agency and willpower. And I want to finish by suggesting that we could let go of the view of the stoic and impassive thinker as the paradigm from which to understand willpower, and start seeing (and valuing) our sensorimotor embodied interactions in a messy and complex world as direct cognitive interventions, and the starting point from which to understand cognition and agency (and not the other way around).
