I recently had a conversation with three self-identified Rutgers people (two Rutgers faculty plus a senior philosopher who visited Rutgers in the early 1990s) who claimed that at Rutgers it is accepted wisdom that psychosemantics was a failure. No one ever properly solved the disjunction problem let alone naturalize semantic content.
I always thought that while the psychosemantic theories of Dretske, Millikan, Fodor et al didn’t solve all the problems and surely deserve further development, they made important progress towards naturalizing semantic content.
But when I suggested that the glass may be seen as half full rather than half empty, the three Rutgers people acted as though I was hopelessly naive and had missed the radical way in which psychosemantics had failed. At the same time, these Rutgers people could not explain in detail off the top of their head why psychosemantics was such an abject failure. So until proven otherwise, I remain convinced that there is something right about psychosemantics.
Anyone cares to chime in?