Explaining our Actions: A Critique of Common-Sense Theorizing (CUP, 2025)
Peter Carruthers
5. The will
Intentions get discussed in a number of places in the book. One is in Chapter 5. Having shown that cognitive science makes use of an irreducible notion of intention (often studied in cognitive neuroscience under the label of “prospective memory”), the final section of the chapter offers an explanation of one of the signature properties of intentions, articulated most clearly by Bratman (1987, 1999). This is that intentions are apt to be self-sustaining, ruling out consideration of competing possibilities and being robust (to some degree) in the face of temptations to act otherwise. One factor in the explanation is that although intentions themselves are “cold” (non-affective) states, when recalled they can benefit from any value one attaches to being steadfast or strong-willed, giving rise to an affective desire to execute the intention. Another is that intentions do interact with affective systems, in any case, in a sort of “top-down” manner. Indications of progress toward a goal are appraised positively, issuing in positive affect, whereas obstacles or things that might frustrate a goal are appraised negatively (Juechems & Summerfield 2019). Moreover, achievement of a goal is generally experienced as rewarding (pleasant). So when one notices that an alternative one is currently considering would prevent one from realizing an existing goal or intention, that will produce some degree of negative affect, thereby serving to inhibit consideration of the prospected option.
A number of other factors further buffer actively pursued goals against distraction or interruption. One is that it is active intentions that drive the direction of both top-down attention and memory search, pursuing and accessing information that is relevant to the execution of the goal. And one of the fundamental facts about top-down attention is not just that it selects, organizes, and boosts the activity of targeted neural populations, but that it actively suppresses competitors (Chun et al. 2011). So to some degree, then, attentional focus is self-sustaining. The same thing is true of motor selection: any activated motor plan not only selects and boosts lower-level motor instructions, but at the same time suppresses any competing motor activation (Duque & Ivry 2009). So what one might call the “actional-focus” of intentional activity is apt to be self-sustaining also. Once a high-level motor plan (an intention) has become activated, competing motor plans will be to some degree suppressed; with the same thing cascading down through the motor hierarchy as more detailed implementational choices are made among options: each choice, once made, suppresses its competitors (Griffin & Strick 2020).
Much later in the book, Chapter 8 takes up the question whether intentions come in degrees of strength (alongside the parallel question about other types of attitude). It argues that they do not, or not intrinsically. (Of course intentions can be more or less deeply embedded among other intentions and can be supported more or less strongly by one’s values, just as beliefs can be more or less deeply embedded in a network of other beliefs. But this is a kind of extrinsic rather than intrinsic strength.) However, the faculty of intention admits of degrees of strength, both as a trait of individuals, and influenced by one’s state (such as being stressed or inebriated).
Evidence of something like trait willpower is provided by studies showing how maturation of the prefrontal cortex predicts capacities for self-control (Vijayakumar et al. 2014), as well as from studies of how delays in the maturation of these networks are responsible for the symptoms of ADHD (Sripada et al. 2014). As is well known, children (especially toddlers) have limited capacities for self-control, with those capacities gradually increasing into young adulthood. There are especially dramatic changes during and after adolescence, when the prefrontal cortex is still maturing along with the strength of its connectivity to subcortical systems involved in emotion and motivation. It seems that the overall balance between goals and intentions, on the one hand, and currently felt desires and emotions, on the other, shifts dramatically during this period. As teenagers mature, it becomes easier for them to stick with their long-term goals and to resist short-term temptations and risky behavior.
Consider what happens, for example, when a student’s goal of studying for a test comes into conflict with an affective desire to play a favorite video game. There is a neural population in the prefrontal cortex that becomes activated from prospective memory (“study for the test”). As we saw earlier, this goal will then direct attention to study-relevant stimuli and study-relevant memories (“where did I leave the textbook?”), and will activate related motor plans. In so doing, however, competing stimuli, memories, and motor activity will be correspondingly suppressed. So the age-dependent maturation of prefrontal-cortex increases the strength and efficacy of these suppressive signals, thereby making goal pursuit in the face of temptation more effective.
Likewise, the effects of stress on the balance between prefrontal cortical networks and affective systems are well known. Following a sleepless night, for example, one becomes much more emotionally reactive, and much less capable of controlling one’s emotional responses to things (Goldstein & Walker 2014; Ben Simon et al. 2020).
While the common-sense idea that willpower admits of degrees is thus partially vindicated by the science, at the same time much of what would ordinarily be described in terms of willpower turns out to result from something more closely resembling emotional intelligence. People succeed in deferred gratification tasks by intelligently modifying the situation, redirecting their attention, or by reappraising the stimulus, for example (Watts et al. 2018; Haimovitz et al. 2020).
The moral? Well, you know by now what I’m going to say: engage with the science.
Ben Simon, E., Rossi, A., Harvey, A., Walker, M,P. (2020). Overanxious and underslept. Nature Human Behavior, 4, 100–110.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of Intention. Cambridge University Press.
Chun, M., Golomb, J., & Turk-Browne, N. (2011). A taxonomy of external and internal attention. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 73–101.
Duque, J. & Ivry, R. (2009). Role of corticospinal suppression during motor preparation. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 2013–2024.
Griffin, D. & Strick, P. (2020). The motor cortex uses active suppression to sculpt movement. Science Advances, eabb8395.
Goldstein, A. & Walker, M.P. (2014). The role of sleep in emotional brain function. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 10, 679–708.
Haimovitz, K., Dweck, C., & Walton, G. (2020). Preschoolers find ways to resist temptation after learning that willpower can be energizing. Developmental Science, 23, e12905.
Juechems, K. & Summerfield, C. (2019). Where does value come from? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23, 836–850.
Sripada, C., Kessler, D., & Angstadt, M. (2014). Lag in maturation of the brain’s intrinsic functional architecture in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 14259–14264.
Vijayakumar, N., Whittle, S., Dennison, M., Yücel, M., Simmons, J., & Allen, N. (2014). Development of temperamental effortful control mediates the relationship between maturation of the prefrontal cortex and psychopathology during adolescence: A 4-year longitudinal study. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 30–43.
Watts, T., Duncan, G., & Quan, H. (2018). Revisiting the marshmallow test: A conceptual replication investigating links between early delay of gratification and later outcomes. Psychological Science, 29, 1159–1177.