Stephen Butterfill

Phenomenal Expectations and the Developmental Origins of Knowledge of Objects

Stephen Butterfill November 14, 2015 November 14, 2015 Featured Scholar: Stephen Butterfill

This is a post about a problem. How do largely informationally encapsulated processes ever nonacidentally operate in harmony with thinking? I will suggest that phenomenal expectations provide least part of the solution: phenomenal expectations matter because they tie different bits of the mind together.

Are There Visual Experiences of Red?

Stephen Butterfill October 29, 2015 October 29, 2015 Featured Scholar: Stephen Butterfill

Instead of answering this question directly, I want to start with another question, one that motivates asking the question of my title. How do humans first come to know about the categorical colour properties of things, properties like redness and blueness? Start with the simplest possible story. Red things visually …

Philosophical issues in cognitive science

Stephen Butterfill October 26, 2015 October 26, 2015 Featured Scholar: Stephen Butterfill

Many thanks to Kristina and John for inviting me to write.