Towards a Multilevel, Mechanistic, Computational, Representational Explanation of Cognition

When I was in graduate school at Pitt around the late 1990s, I hung out with some faculty and students in the Psych Department. One day I asked one of the more ambitious Psych grad students, “what’s the future of psychology?” He answered without hesitation: “cognitive neuroscience”. Since then, psychology …

Nativism Meets the Causal Revolution

The distinction between innate and acquired traits is relevant to the long-standing debate between nativists and empiricists about whether knowledge (of concepts, of language, etc.) is primarily innate or acquired. The debate can’t get off the ground if the distinction is baseless or confused. In recent years, some philosophers have …

Consciousness, Computation, and Cognition

Much cognitive processing is unconscious, but some is conscious. By ‘consciousness,’ I mean phenomenal consciousness, conscious experience, what it’s like to be someone, or qualia. The relation between consciousness, computation, and cognition is a very difficult question. The two main traditional views are functionalism and the identity theory. According to …

Neural Representations Are Observable, and Neural Computation Is Sui Generis

The received view in the philosophy of cognitive science is that cognition is (largely explained by) a kind of digital computation, and computation requires representation. Therefore, if neurocognitive systems are computational, they manipulate digital representations of some sort. According to this received view, representations are unobservable entities posited by successful …

Back to Top