Teleological Functions: Fixing the Goal-Contribution Account

In my previous post, I mentioned that mechanistic explanations are functional. What I mean by that is that mechanisms and their component parts have functions and such functions contribute to mechanistic explanation because, by performing their functions, components contribute to the activities of the whole mechanism. The notion of function …

Composition, Realization, and Constitutive Explanation: An Ontologically Egalitarian Account of Multilevel Mechanisms

Thanks to Dan Burnston and Nick Byrd for this opportunity to introduce Neurocognitive Mechanisms: Explaining Biological Cognition (OUP 2020). This book is the culmination of my main research program over the last 20+ years; it offers a comprehensive foundation for the science of biological cognition. In these posts, I’ll outline …

Reminder: Two Publishing Venues in the Philosophy of Neuroscience

I periodically remind people of a couple of venues for work in the philosophy of neuroscience: The Synthese Topical Collection on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy. The deadline is purely nominal; submissions are processed as they come in and published online shortly after acceptance. To be considered, you need to submit …

Dear Colleague Letter: Early-concept Grants for Exploratory Research on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Society – Supported Jointly with the Partnership on AI

This is an NSF grant opportunity that might be of interest to some of you.

Neurocognitive Mechanisms: Explaining Biological Cognition

I just completed a fairly polished draft of a new book, entitled Neurocognitive Mechanisms: Explaining Biological Cognition. It gives a comprehensive defense of a computational theory of cognition updated for the era of cognitive neuroscience, including ontological foundations, with surprises for both supporters and critics of traditional computational theories of …

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