Split-brain subjects talk about themselves using the first-person, singular, pronoun. Of course, by hypothesis, it’s always just one of two split-brain thinkers doing the talking. (In some subjects, R seems to have learned to speak a bit, but never in whole sentences.) Still, this thinker and speaker—L—consistently uses the first-person …
In yesterday’s post I argued that a split-brain subject is not unitary qua thinker but is actually composed of two thinkers. The book also defends two further, related duality claims: that R and L are distinct subjects of experience and that they are distinct intentional agents. To many people, however, …
The book argues for three duality claims: one concerning split-brain consciousness, one concerning split-brain intentional agency, and one concerning split-brain psychology generally. Each of the duality claims amounts to a claim about personal identity. If there are two centers or streams of conscious there must be two subjects of conscious …
Thanks, John, for this opportunity to talk about my book, and thanks, everyone else, for reading. The book is an empirically informed work of personal identity about the split-brain phenomenon. “Split-brain surgery” is a colloquial term for a surgery that cuts through the corpus callosum (and sometimes additional white matter …
