books Archives - Page 2 of 18

3. Reducing the Phenomenal

The phenomenal concept strategy has been pursued by many different authors. The basic idea is to explain the problematic thought experiments (zombies, Mary, and the explanatory gap) in terms of the distinctive set of concepts we can use when thinking about our own access-conscious nonconceptual mental states. People differ over …

2. The Global Workspace

Peter Carruthers January 14, 2020 Consciousness / Peter Carruthers: Human and Animal Minds11 Comments

The best theory of phenomenal consciousness is one that equates it with the contents of the so-called global workspace (a.k.a. working memory)—or rather, with a subset thereof. Why a subset? Because although conceptual information can be bound into the contents of perceptual and imagistic states, and made available in the …

1. Consciousness Problems

Peter Carruthers January 13, 2020 Consciousness / Peter Carruthers: Human and Animal Minds23 Comments

A number of factors make the problem of consciousness seem harder than it is. I will say something briefly about two of them here. One is that people the world over are tacit dualists about the mental, making them much more receptive towards non-physical qualia than they otherwise would be. …

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John Schwenkler January 12, 2020 books

We are pleased to have Peter Carruthers (University of Maryland) blogging this week on Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest (Oxford, 2019). To view all of Peter’s posts on a single page, please click here.

3. Aspects of the Self

Majid Davoody Beni November 2, 2019 Consciousness / Ethics / Majid Davoody Beni: Structuring the Self3 Comments

In the previous post, I showed how the self-structure could be specified. The self has also some properties, e.g., phenomenal, social, and ethical ones, that are capable of being specified in structural terms. Let us begin with phenomenal aspects, which amount to the capacity to have consciousness and intentional states. …

2. Specifying Self-Structures

Majid Davoody Beni October 31, 2019 Majid Davoody Beni: Structuring the Self / Neuroscience; Philosophy of ScienceOne Comment

The Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS) is presented as an extension of structural realism in the philosophy of many-particle physics. Structural realism addresses the problem of conflicting ontological consequences with regards to the existence of individual objects at the sub-particle level by making commitments to commonalities. In the …

1. Structuring the Self, a new metaphysical enterprise

Majid Davoody Beni October 30, 2019 Majid Davoody Beni: Structuring the Self / Philosophy of Mind / Philosophy of Science / Self-consciousness3 Comments

As before, I am very grateful to John for letting me present my work. My new book Structuring the Self (2019, Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science), did not initially aim to introduce a new insight into the nature of selfhood so much as to give …

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John Schwenkler October 30, 2019 books

We are grateful to Majid Davoody Beni for blogging this week on Structuring the Self, newly published by Palgrave Macmillan in the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science series. To view all of Majid’s posts on a single page, please click here.

5. Memory as an epistemically generative source

Jordi Fernandez October 25, 2019 Epistemology / Jordi Fernandez: Memory - A Self-Referential Account / MemoryOne Comment

This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter seven, the epistemically generative character of memory. There is a debate on whether memory generates justification for beliefs about the past, or …

4. The experience of ownership in memory

Jordi Fernandez October 24, 2019 Jordi Fernandez: Memory - A Self-Referential Account / Memory / Self-consciousnessOne Comment

This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter five, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, the feeling of a memory as being one’s own (a ‘feeling of mineness’ in …

3. The experience of time in memory

Jordi Fernandez October 23, 2019 Consciousness / Jordi Fernandez: Memory - A Self-Referential Account / Memory3 Comments

This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter four, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, two aspects of the temporal phenomenology of memory. Firstly, when we remember something, we …

2. The intentionality of memory

Jordi Fernandez October 22, 2019 Intentionality / Jordi Fernandez: Memory - A Self-Referential Account / Memory2 Comments

This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the content of memories; the topic of chapter three. I defend the view that memories are self-referential in that they represent a property of themselves. Specifically, …

1. The metaphysics of memory

Jordi Fernandez October 21, 2019 Jordi Fernandez: Memory - A Self-Referential Account / Memory / metaphysics of mind13 Comments

This week I am writing a series of posts about my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). My first post, today, concerns the metaphysics of experiential, or episodic, memory. In chapter two, I address the question of what it takes for a subject’s mental state to …

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John Schwenkler October 21, 2019 books

We are pleased to have Jordi Fernández blogging this week on Memory: A Self-Referential Account, newly published by Oxford University Press. To view all of Jordi’s posts on a single page, please click here.

The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification

Declan Smithies September 13, 2019 Consciousness / Declan Smithies: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness / EpistemologyOne Comment

This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Over the past three days, I’ve discussed the epistemic role of consciousness in perception, cognition, and introspection. In this final post, I want to explain how I integrate these claims about the …

A Simple Theory of Introspection

Declan Smithies September 12, 2019 Consciousness / Declan Smithies: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness / Self-consciousness

This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. What is introspection? Literally, ‘introspection’ means ‘looking within’. But the term is often used as a placeholder for the distinctively first-personal way …

Beliefs and Subdoxastic States

Declan Smithies September 11, 2019 Belief / Cognition / Consciousness / Declan Smithies: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness4 Comments

This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in cognition. Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, an unconscious creature with the capacity for cognition? As I use the term, …

Blindsight and Super-Blindsight

Declan Smithies September 10, 2019 Consciousness / Declan Smithies: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness / perception15 Comments

This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in perception. Human perception is normally conscious: there is something it is like for us to perceive the world around us. And yet there …

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John Schwenkler September 9, 2019 books

We are grateful to Declan Smithies for blogging this week on The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford, 2019). To read all his posts on a single page, please click here.

The Mental Lives of Zombies

Declan Smithies September 9, 2019 Consciousness / Declan Smithies: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness2 Comments

This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Thanks to John Schwenkler for hosting me. Today, I’ll start by situating the project of the book within a broader landscape in the philosophy of mind. What is the role of phenomenal …