Fabrizio Calzavarini, University of Turin Bence Nanay’s Mental Imagery (OUP) is an impressive work that provides a comprehensive neurofunctional exploration of the idea that mental imagery is “perceptual representation that is not directly triggered by sensory input” (p. 4). Bence’s ability to combine sophisticated philosophical analyses with careful discussion of …
Dr Andrea Blomkvistandrea.blomkvist@glasgow.ac.ukCentre for the Study of Perceptual ExperienceUniversity of Glasgow One of the most imagination-capturing concepts discussed in Bence Nanay’s recent book Mental Imagery (Nanay, 2024) is unconscious mental imagery. For many of us, mental imagery seems inherently phenomenally conscious (see for example Kung, 2010). But in Nanay’s book, …
Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience. Not really a Precis.Bence Nanay, University of Antwerp Let’s assume you’re reading this piece on your phone – a reasonable assumption these days. And let’s assume you’re reading it while standing in line at the checkout of your grocery store – a good time to …
Many thanks again to Andre Curtis-Trudel, Marcin Milkowski, Danielle Williams, and Mazviita Chirimuuta for their commentaries on our recent book The Physical Signature of Computation: A Robust Mapping Account. The medium independence of computation seems to have caused trouble for the latter three commentators, so we take this opportunity to …
The Physical Signature of Computation (PSC) builds on previous publications by Gualtiero Piccinini that have shaped the debate over the nature of information processing in the brain. I will focus on this topic, the subject of Chapter 9, and discuss how PSC inherits some of the flaws embedded in the …
The Physical Signature of Computation is the most “robust” mapping view that’s ever hit the market. It is impressive in its detail and the careful attention paid to its characterization of both the physical system and the formal computational description—a true service to the philosophical literature. The book promises a …
Anderson and Piccinini (2024) offer a foundational approach to understanding physical computation. The book’s primary aim is to defend the notion of physical computation against trivialization. Critics argue that ascribing computation lacks a factual basis, which, if true, would render computational explanations ineffective by stripping them of explanatory power. Piccinini …
