Extending epistemic innocence beyond belief

A picture of continuity Some beliefs are epistemically innocent when they are irrational but provide epistemic benefits that would not be available otherwise. We already saw some examples: delusion, confabulation, and optimistically biased beliefs. Here I explain why I apply epistemic innocence to different types of beliefs across clinical and …

Optimism: ignorance or hope?

Powerful agents We are likely to overestimate our capacities and make exceedingly rosy predictions about our future. This widespread bias towards optimism is a robust finding in psychology. It is also a clear case of epistemic irrationality which has serious implications for risk assessment. According to a recent article, unrealistic …

Confabulation: good, bad, or inevitable?

Incurable confabulators Philosophers sometimes describe humans as rational animals. It would be more accurate to say that we are confabulating animals. The problem is that it is not always easy to distinguish our frequent practice of confabulation from the rare moments when we exercise our rationality. A provocative idea is …

Expertise: An Interdisciplinary Solution

Over the week, I have sketched three attempts to answer the questions: What is an expert? and How does someone become an expert? Though I’ve glossed over many details, the accounts point roughly to the following features of expertise: Expertise involves extensive competence in a domain (including extensive tacit or …

Expertise and Performance

Regardless of the plausibility of truth-based accounts of expertise, no one doubts that there are performative experts. We trust airline pilots to get us where we’re going, engineers to build safe bridges, and surgeons to perform complicated procedures. And no one denies that performative expertise involves some degree of propositional …

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We are thrilled that Jamie Carlin Watson is joining us until Friday! Watson will post daily about their new book Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction (2020, Bloomsbury Academic). You can find all their posts on one page here (as they become available).

Expertise: An Interdisciplinary Problem

I am grateful to The Brains Blog for the opportunity to discuss my book Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020). In this opening post, I introduce what I call the five Big Questions about expertise and explain how my book focuses on attempts by philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists to …

Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias

This post about epistemic in justice and implicit bias by Kathy Puddifoot and Jules Holroyd is the fourth and final post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). Find the other posts here. Epistemic injustice occurs when a person …

The Limitations of Implicit Bias

This post about epistemic in justice and implicit bias by Susanna Siegel is the third post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). Find the other posts here. The first waves of research in psychology surrounding implicit bias claimed …

The Embodied Biased Mind

This post about embodied cognition and implicit bias by Céline Leboeuf is the second post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). Find the other posts here. We often think of our mental lives as “in our heads.” This …

The Psychology Of Bias: From Data to Theory

This post about psychological explanation and implicit bias by Gabbrielle Johnson is the first post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). Find the other posts here. Here’s a peculiar thing about people: often what they do doesn’t match …

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We are ecstatic to have Gabbrielle Johnson, Céline Leboeuf, Susanna Siegel, Kathy Puddifoot, and Jules Holroyd joining us this week to give us a preview of their chapters in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). Each day around 8:00am EDT one of their …

Lakatos Award 2020: Nicholas Shea’s (Open Access) Representation In Cognitive Science

We are pleased to share the news that friend of the Brains community, Nicholas Shea, has been awarded the 2020 Lakatos Award for their open access book Representation In Cognitive Science (Oxford University Press, 2018). You can download a free PDF copy of the book at http://bit.ly/RepnCognSci Shea will receive …

Natural Pedagogy and Emotions

Gergely and other psychologists (Gergely – Unoka 2008) advance the hypothesis of cooperation between the natural pedagogy and the social biofeedback models. Their proposal takes into account the infant’s internalisation process of contingently “marked” emotion-mirroring displays. Such affective mirroring manifestations involve the infant’s generation of second-order representations of primary non-conscious …

Trust and Testimony in Social Learning

Natural pedagogy focuses on knowledge transfer and how such transfer may occur. The theory describes a communicative relationship which is, by definition, an exchange influenced and determined by the principle of epistemic primacy that portrays infants as «avid seekers of information provided by others» (Poulin-Dubois et al. 2010, p. 303). …

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