Inquiry under bounds (Part 5: Applying the account)
This post applies the reason-responsive consequentialist view of rational inquiry to shed light on bounded rationality, the Standard Picture, and the epistemology of inquiry.
This post applies the reason-responsive consequentialist view of rational inquiry to shed light on bounded rationality, the Standard Picture, and the epistemology of inquiry.
This post gives three arguments for the reason-responsive consequentialist view of rational inquiry.
This post develops a theory of rational inquiry for bounded agents: the reason-responsive consequentialist view.
This post introduces bounded rationality by contrasting it with a received Standard Picture of rationality.
This post begins a five-part series introducing David Thorstad’s book, Inquiry under bounds.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) has published its inaugural issue: a special issue on “Radical disruptions of self-consciousness”, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Raphaël Millière. This special issue is about something most of us might find hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether …
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences is inviting contributions to a celebratory volume on the neural correlates of consciousness. In 2000, MIT published „Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions“, edited by Thomas Metzinger. The volume brought together empirical neuroscientists, psychologists, anaesthesiologists, and philosophers, all participants at the 2nd ASSC meeting …