Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) has published its inaugural issue: a special issue on “Radical disruptions of self-consciousness”, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Raphaël Millière.
This special issue is about something most of us might find hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether missing.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) is a peer-reviewed, not-for-profit open-access journal that is free for authors and readers. PhiMiSci focuses on the interface between philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
1) Raphaël Millière, Thomas Metzinger: Radical disruptions of self-consciousness: Editorial introduction
3) Sascha Benjamin Fink: Look who’s talking! Varieties of ego-dissolution without paradox
4) Rocco Joseph Gennaro: Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts
5) Chris Letheby: Being for no-one: Psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity
6) Jakub Limanowski, Karl Friston: Attenuating oneself: An active inference perspective on “selfless” experiences
8) Raphaël Millière: The varieties of selflessness
9) Miguel Ángel Sebastián: Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution: An analysis of (some) altered states of consciousness