(See all posts in this series here.) Movements of the Mind (MoM) is about the structure of agency. It also gives a theory of attention. Indeed, it also provides a theory of psychological bias. For good measure, it argues that intention is a type of memory, linking it to working …
Hi All, Please join us this week for a series of posts by Wayne Wu, discussing his exciting new book, Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Intention, Attention, and Action (Oxford University Press). We will have a post each day. Feel free to contribute to the discussion by commenting …
By Tillman Vierkant, University of Edinburgh (See all the posts in this series here.) I am very grateful to Gloria Andrada, Paulius Rimkevicius and Ting Huang for their very insightful comments. I hope that my replies will help to clarify some of the issues raised and stimulate further discussion. Let …
By Ting Huang (See all posts in this series here.) In a prior symposium on the book I posed the following clarifying questions to Vierkant regarding his stance on free will: Does “managerial control” provide basis for moral responsibility? In line with Holton’s conception of choice, what role does consciousness …
By Paulius Rimkevicius, Chapman University (See all posts in this series here.) Like a tinker, who travels freely from place to place mending metal utensils and sometimes ends up creating quite an extraordinary-looking gadget out of the simple old things that he finds, a philosopher who is well-versed in more …
By Gloria Andrada, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. (See all the posts in this series here.) One of my favorite things about Vierkant’s book is that it provides an original argument for extended cognition, one that begins with the role of intentional action in epistemic agency. This makes it really interesting …
By Tillmann Vierkant, University of Edinburgh (See all posts in this symposium here.) Thanks for giving me the opportunity to say a few words about The Tinkering Mind! I have been bothered by the question of how important intentional action is for epistemic agency for a long time. I have …
