The Brains Blog

How could we rationally suppose that we lack free will?

[The following is a guest post by Bob Lockie. — JS] He who says that all things happen of necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that all happens by necessity; for on his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity (Epicurus 1964: XL). Epicurus’s famous …

Evolving Enactivism: The Natural Origins of Content

Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin January 28, 2018 January 29, 2018 Content / Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin: Evolving Enactivism

In our previous posts, we have so far focused on: (1) clarifying our understanding of Ur-intentionality – REC’s positive proposal for understanding the thesis that basic cognition lacks content; (2) reviewing the problems faced by classic teleosemantic theories that motivate adopting REC’s proposal; and (3) detailing some of the theoretical …

Evolving Enactivism: Neurodynamics sans content

Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin January 25, 2018 January 28, 2018 Content / Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin: Evolving Enactivism / Neuroscience / representation

In a direct challenge to radical, anti-representational proposals about how to conceive of cognition, Aizawa (2015) asks “If the brain does not contribute information processing or symbol manipulation or the transformation of representations … then what does it do?” (2015, 761–762). Given that REC embraces precisely such radicalisms, what alternative …

Evolving Enactivism: Ur-Intentionality – What’s it All About?

Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin January 24, 2018 January 28, 2018 Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin: Evolving Enactivism / Intentionality / Philosophy of Mind

In our previous instalment to this blog series, we alluded to a subtle but pivotal adjustment that our Radically Enactive account of Cognition, REC, recommends making to what, in analytic circles, is the standard conception of minds. The recommendation is that we conceive of the intentional and phenomenal aspects of …

Evolving Enactivism: An Introduction

Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin January 22, 2018 January 28, 2018 Action / Cognition / Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin: Evolving Enactivism / Philosophy of Mind / reduction

Thanks to John Schwenkler for inviting us to guest-blog this week about our new book Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017). It is often said that two minds are better than one. Though ‘mind’ is a count noun, we don’t imagine that people really have …

Now Featured

John Schwenkler January 22, 2018 January 29, 2018 books

Many thanks to Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin for blogging this week on Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT Press, 2017). To view all their posts on a single page, please click here.

Consciousness is something you do

Sebastian Watzl January 19, 2018 January 19, 2018 Attention / Consciousness / Mental Action / metaphysics of mind / Philosophy of Mind / Sebastian Watzl: Structuring Mind / Self-consciousness

Many parents who look into the eyes of their newborn baby encounter something wonderful, and awe inspiring. There in those eyes they get a glimpse of a new perspective, a new point of view on the world. A new consciousness. The idea that consciousness is the subjective perspective we each …