Is the mind is a Turing machine? How could we tell?

I have just finished writing a draft of paper on Turing machines being equivalent (or not) to human minds. This is an expanded (but still quite brief in many respects) version of my talk from the last year’s Studia Logica conference on Church’s Thesis. I defend the mechanist account of …

Call For Papers: Collective Intentionality

Collective Intentionality VIII University of Manchester August 28-31, 2012 Collective Intentionality VIII – as the name suggests! – is the eighth in a series of large-scale international events on joint and/or cooperative action, reasoning, decision, intention, attention, and associated mental and agential phenomena, topics that impact on issues in ethics …

Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition

This paper (co-authored with theoretical and experimental neuroscientist Sonya Bahar) is what I’ve been aiming at during all these years.  This is why I made this big fuss over developing an adequate non-semantic account of computation. I think the paper is finally ready to submit, but I’d love to get some …

Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches

Carl Craver and I have written a paper arguing that functional analyses are just elliptical mechanistic explanations, contrary to the received view that functional analysis is distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanation.  Corollary:  contrary to the received view, psychological explanation is not distinct and autonomous from neuroscientific explanation–rather, psychological explanation …

The Demise of "Cognitive Science"

For several years, I’ve felt that cognitive science as it was originally conceived is being progressively replaced by cognitive neuroscience. By “cognitive science as it was originally conceived,” I mean primarily the alliance between traditional cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence (either “classicist” or “connectionist”), supplemented by contributions from linguistics, philosophy of …

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