The Argument for Concept Splitting from Language

In our forthcoming paper, “Splitting Concepts,” Sam Scott and I argue, among other things, that the notion of concept may need to be split into linguistic representations (responsible for cognition that involves language) and nonlinguistic representations (responsible for the rest of cognition). Roughly, the reason is that linguistic cognition appears …

Central APA Highlights

Last weekend I was at the Central APA in Chicago. Here are some events I attended that may be of interest to philosophers of mind:Henry Jackman, in “Fodor on Concepts and Modes of Presentation,” argued that Fodor’s treatment of the publicity constraint on concepts is available to a certain kind …

Cognition and the Brain

A. Brook and K. Akins, eds., Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, Cambridge, CUP, 2005.A collection of articles by a group of good philosophers of neuroscience, on a wide range of topics (theory in neuroscience, representation, “visuomotor transformation,” color, consciousness). Should be of interest to most philosophers …

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