I’m happy to announce that my criticism of Held et al.’s 2011 paper on Molyneux’s question, which began as a post here at Brains, appeared today in a short paper in i-Perception. The core of my argument is the same as before, though now I draw on a wider range …
Recently there has been a lot of interesting work (including some by one of our own) done on the epistemic status of first-personal reports on conscious states. The usual target in this tradition is the assumption of a certain kind of first-person authority concerning what consciousness is like for someone …
Male squirrel monkeys are normally red-green colorblind. They are missing one of the opsins. A group at UW added a gene for the opsin to a virus, squirted it into the retinas of two male monkeys, and after about 5 months they were able to perform discrimination tasks that required …
