Neuroscience and Its Philosophy 2006
The yearly issue of Synthese devoted to philosophy of neuroscience is out (requires subscription to see the articles).
Category: Philosophy of Science
A Note on Heterophenomenology
In comments to some previous posts, Marcin Milkowski raised a spirited defense of Dennett’s heterophenomenology (HF) as a correct methodology of data from first-person reports (about mental states). Among other statements, he made the following: “HF is not about inferring beliefs from verbal behavior in any setting. It’s about …
Science against Religion?
Today’s NY Times has an interesting report on a recent conference discussing whether scientists should challenge religion more aggressively.
Knobe on the Continuity between Science and Common Sense
Joshua Knobe was kind enough to write me as follows (reproduced with permission):I was happy to see that you wrote up a description of oursession [two weeks ago at the PSA Meeting], and I’m glad that you are bringing attention to these important questions about the relationship between common sense andscientific …
Recent Sources on Functions and Mechanisms
Next Spring, I’m teaching a course on mechanisms (mechanistic explanation) and functions (functional explanation). I’m considering some of the following sources: The Monist, 87.1 (2004). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37.1 (2006). Allen, C., M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder, Eds. (1998). Nature’s Purposes: Analysis of Function and Design …
Multiple-choice test on physicalism
Consider the following argument: 1. Eve’s believing that p is realized by having a token of p in her head. 2. Having a token of p in one’s head is realized by some detailed, neural state. So, 3. Eve’s believing that p is realized by some detailed neural state. …
Computation without Representation
As some of you may know, I am engaged in a long-term campaign against the view that concrete computations (computational states, computing mechanisms) are individuated, even in part, by their semantic properties. Of course, computations may be interpreted, i.e., assigned semantic content, but this is not part of their individuation. …