Consider the following argument: 1. Eve’s believing that p is realized by having a token of p in her head. 2. Having a token of p in one’s head is realized by some detailed, neural state. So, 3. Eve’s believing that p is realized by some detailed neural state. …
On my long, long list of “Things I Don’t Really Have Time to Think About But Wish I Did” is the following simple question: Does dualism make a difference to one’s overall view of the mind? Since some might assume that the obvious answer to the question is an obvious …
Jeff Dauer showed me this Scientific American article (by Philip Ross) on the cognitive psychology of expertise. An easy, fun, and rewarding read. Bottom line: work hard at it for about 10 years, and you’ll master it.
new web page dedicated to the philosophy of neuroscience
Why is there little work on the phil of psychiatry?
Barsalou, Glenberg, Prinz, Damasio and other neo-empiricists have theoretically and experimentally challenged the once dominant view that representations in higher cognitive processes are amodal (eg, Fodor, Pylyshyn). They have renewed a century-old perspective on the mind, according to which representations in perceptual processes and representations in higher cognitive processes are, …
Which, if any, semantic properties would the utterances of a community of language users have, even if we assumed that the language users had no internal semantic states? My answer will come in multiple posts. Note that by ‘semantic properties’ I mean things like reference, truth, aboutness, and usability-in-an-inference. I will ultimately argue, with a couple of caveats, that their expressions would have a full suite of semantic properties.
In this, the first post in the series, I summarize, defend, and clarify the Standard View of the relationship between the semantic properties of internal states and public linguistic expressions. I’d be interested in comments, as these are ideas I’m slowly developing, and injections of criticism at this early juncture would be most welcome.
