I listened to the first lecture in David Chalmers’ Locke Lectures currently taking place at Oxford and I was intrigued by the argument he gave in defense of the claim that we can have a priori knowledge and do conceptual analysis even if we cannot give definitions of the concepts …
Some of you might be interested by the symposium that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies on Doing without Concepts. Chris Hill (Brown, here) and Diana Raffman (Toronto, here) comment on the book, and I reply. Hugo Mercier IUPenn) has also a review in Biology and Philosophy.
A lot of philosophers seem to take the higher-order thought theory of consciousness to be eliminative or deflationary about consciousness; of course, it doesn’t help that people go around saying that we need to get rid of qualia or even that we should endorse the claim that we ourselves are …
By Brandon Towl Today, I spent a little time thinking about introspection and the various ways that it can be used as evidence (a topic that our own Gualtiero Piccinini has written about, though I also had in mind the kind of “polling” that Hurlburt and Schwitzgeibel do). I began …
By Jim Virtel Ladies and gentlemen and children of all ages: welcome to the 107th Philosophers’ Carnival! Come inside to see our amazing attractions: Our main tent contains posts concerning: Philosophy of Mind! – Gary Williams argues that empiricists don’t have to accept Berkeley’s conclusion that sense-data are private at …
Yesterday I attended Dave Chalmers’ session of the Mind and
Language Seminar where we discussed his new paper on the singularity.I have previously seen him give this talk at CUNY and I was looking forward to the commentary from Jesse and Ned and the discussion that
followed. …
Have you ever felt that you could really use a reference defending exactly the bold and sweeping claim you are making? I’ve recently stumbled upon a new way to solve this problem: cite the book you’re writing. That’s right! The very book that makes the claim that needs support. On …
