In an earlier post I outlined the case for qualia realism from the higher-order perspective as I see it.Dave Chalmers worried that one of the moves was too quick. The move in question is the move from concepts making a difference to phenomenal experience to their determining phenomenal experience. Basically the line I was pushing was that …
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This may be worth checking out. Martha Farah conducted interviews with University of Pennsylvania faculty, as part of a recent lecture series, entitled “Conversations on Neuroscience and Society. ” The interviews include discussion on the neurodynamical underpinnings of emotion, gender, warfare, crime and philosopher Susan Schneider’s views on how our great-great grandchildren might think. Online …
Any Brains readers in the New York area should consider themselves invited to the NYCC jam session on May 31st…for more info (and some fun videos and tunes) check out our facebook page….if you are in town come on down and have a drink with us or join in the …
I listened to the first lecture in David Chalmers’ Locke Lectures currently taking place at Oxford and I was intrigued by the argument he gave in defense of the claim that we can have a priori knowledge and do conceptual analysis even if we cannot give definitions of the concepts …
Some of you might be interested by the symposium that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies on Doing without Concepts. Chris Hill (Brown, here) and Diana Raffman (Toronto, here) comment on the book, and I reply. Hugo Mercier IUPenn) has also a review in Biology and Philosophy.
A lot of philosophers seem to take the higher-order thought theory of consciousness to be eliminative or deflationary about consciousness; of course, it doesn’t help that people go around saying that we need to get rid of qualia or even that we should endorse the claim that we ourselves are …
