Logic as contingent

Below the fold is part of an ongoing argument that logical truths (and rules of inference) can sit comfortably within a naturalistic worldview. It was inspired in part by reading the wonderful articles Is logic a theory of the obvious? and Logical consequence: an epistemic outlook by Gila Sher (UCSD), who beautifully pushes the Quinean thesis that even those logical axioms in the center of our web of belief are open to revision based on empirical and conceptual factors.

The topic doesn’t have a lot directly to do with brains, but is part of my ongoing attempt to fit logic within a naturalist framework. If we can establish some plausibility for the claim that logical truths are open to revision, then I will feel more free to explore how logic fits into a more general story of how brains (and the logics they endorse) help us get about in the world. It will also help me think more clearly about how advocates of informational semantics can handle logical truths, which is something that (to my knowledge) hasn’t been addressed by the Dretskians.

Sellars’ Papers available at the Archive of Scientific Philosophy

Wilfrid Sellars was one of the most important philosophers of mind in the 20th Century.  I just discovered that the complete collection of his unpublished papers and correspondence is available at the Archive of Scientific Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh.  The collection was created by Pitt archivist Lance Lugar, who …

BrainVoyager Brain Tutor

Those of you who, like me, are a little rusty on their neuroanatomy might like to check out a free program called ‘BrainVoyager Brain Tutor’, available <a href=”https://www.brainvoyager.com/BrainTutor.html”>here</a>.  The program lets you interactively explore high-quality 3D head and brain models, which can be rotated, moved, zoomed and morphed in real-time.  I’ve found …

They Myth of Psychological Laws

It amazes me how many philosophy papers, even by young philosophers, appeal to “psychological laws”.  For instance, they may discuss whether psychological laws are reducible to more fundamental laws, or whether they are intentional, or whathaveyou.  This way of talking seems to presuppose that psychologists explain behavior in terms of laws.Where do they …

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