Logic as contingent
Below the fold is part of an ongoing argument that logical truths (and rules of inference) can sit comfortably within a naturalistic worldview. It was inspired in part by reading the wonderful articles Is logic a theory of the obvious? and Logical consequence: an epistemic outlook by Gila Sher (UCSD), who beautifully pushes the Quinean thesis that even those logical axioms in the center of our web of belief are open to revision based on empirical and conceptual factors.
The topic doesn’t have a lot directly to do with brains, but is part of my ongoing attempt to fit logic within a naturalist framework. If we can establish some plausibility for the claim that logical truths are open to revision, then I will feel more free to explore how logic fits into a more general story of how brains (and the logics they endorse) help us get about in the world. It will also help me think more clearly about how advocates of informational semantics can handle logical truths, which is something that (to my knowledge) hasn’t been addressed by the Dretskians.