The Unexplained Intellect: Consequences of Imperfection

The previous post argued that Theoretical Computer Science can show things to be naturalistically inexplicable—(where this is much stronger than showing them to be inexplicable with a Classically Computational Theory)—by showing those things to require more time than the universe allows.  I’ve not yet said anything about which things might …

The Unexplained Intellect: The Importance of Computability

Theoretical Computer Science has a broader import than its name suggests.  To appreciate it, remember what Turing proved: that a certain hypothetical machine would be able to compute every recursively definable function in a finite amount of time.  If we supplement that theorem with a plausible assumption about physics then …

The Unexplained Intellect: Computation and The Explanation of Intelligence

A lot of philosophers think that consciousness is what makes the mind/body problem interesting, perhaps because they think that consciousness is the only part of that problem that remains wholly philosophical.  Other aspects of the mind are taken to be explicable by scientific means, even if explanatorily adequate theories of …

The Unexplained Intellect: The Mind is Not a Hoard of Sentences

In subsequent posts I’ll focus on The Unexplained Intellect’s main claims.  In this one I’ll identify the cause that those claims serve.  I’m grateful to the blog’s editor for the opportunity to do this (and to you for reading).

Experiencing Phenomenology: Experiencing Oneself

On Husserl’s picture of the phenomenological method, the phenomenologist must reflect on their own experience. So the practice of phenomenology involves some form of self-awareness. But how exactly ought we to characterise this self-awareness and, in particular, does it involves an awareness not just of our experiences but also of …

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