CFP: The Relational Self

CFPs / Self-consciousness
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Interdisciplinary Special Issue to appear in TOPOI, an International Journal of Philosophy THE RELATIONAL SELF: BASIC FORMS OF SELF-AWARENESS Editor: Anna CIAUNICA (Institute of Philosophy Porto / Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences, UCL London) The SI will consist of six invited contributors and a matched number of submitted papers (for submission instructions …

Final CFP: The Philosophical Significance of Molyneux’s Question

CFPs / perception

This is a final reminder that submissions for the conference on The Philosophical Significance of Molyneux’s question, at the University of York from June 5-6, 2017, are due by February 15. The invited speakers are Becko Copenhaver, M.G.F. Martin, Mohan Matthen, and L.A. Paul. For further details and to submit your work, visit spinperceptionnetwork.wordpress.com/mq/.

CFA: The Rational Role of Cognitive Phenomenology

CFPs / Cognition / Epistemology
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Call for Abstracts, Workshop: The Rational Role of Cognitive Phenomenology University of Bergen, June 6–7th, 2017. Extended deadline for submissions: February 26th, 2017 Travel and accommodation funding is available. The organisers encourage participation from members of under-represented groups. Please scroll down for further information. DESCRIPTION Previous orthodoxy in philosophy of …

Emotion and Evaluative Phenomenology

Consciousness / Emotion / Michelle Montague: The Given
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In the final chapter of The Given, I describe the rich complexity involved in experiencing emotions. I restrict my attention to occurrent emotional episodes that are not only conscious, but are also intentional. I consider two questions: [i] What kind of property attributions do we typically make in having emotions? …

Thought and Cognitive Phenomenology

Consciousness / Michelle Montague: The Given / Phenomenology
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Chapter 8 of The Given discusses the topic of cognitive phenomenology. My view of the matter is simple: either accept cognitive phenomenology or deny that there is such a thing as conscious thought. How can you deny the existence of conscious thought?! So, grant that cognitive phenomenology exists. Cognitive phenomenology, …

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