What can we learn from the Implicit Association Test? A Brains Blog Roundtable

Recently there has been a lot of discussion of the value of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as a measure of implicit bias — discussion generated largely by a new paper by Calvin Lai, Patrick Forscher and their colleagues that presents the results of a meta-analysis of studies conducted using the …

Call For Papers: 3rd Annual Minds Online Conference

The editors of the Brains blog, together with the Departments of Philosophy at Florida State University and the University of Houston, are pleased to announce that the third annual Minds Online conference will be held during the month of September, 2017. And we hope that you’ll submit, participate, and share this with interested philosophers and cognitive scientists. Keynotes …

Colour and the Problem of Consciousness

How should we explain ‘what it is like’ to perceive colour? One of the reasons why naïve realist theories of colour are interesting is that they promise to contribute towards a solution to the problem of consciousness. There is something puzzling about the way that problems about consciousness and conscious …

Quietism, Naive Realism, and the Nature of Philosophy

One of the reasons why philosophical discussions of colour are interesting and important is that they bear on a number of wider philosophical questions. In today’s post I want to introduce some meta-philosophical questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry that philosophical discussions of colour help to bring into focus. …

Colours as Observational Properties

The second main claim made by the naïve realist is that colours are distinct from the physical properties of objects. In saying that colours are distinct from the physical properties of objects, the naïve realist is not necessarily saying that are ‘perfectly simple’ properties whose nature cannot be described further; …

Colour Constancy and the Mind-Independence of Colour

According to the naïve realist, colours are mind-independent properties of objects that are distinct from their physical properties. In today’s post I outline the argument for the first part of the view: the claim that colours are mind-independent. To say that colours are mind-independent properties is to say that their …

CFP: Replicability in Cognitive Science

A planned special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology will focus on the subject of replicability and systematic error in cognitive science. For a call for contributions to the issue, see here. Potential topics include but are not limited to: The impact of the replicability problem on long standing theories …

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