Consider the visual experience of a normally functioning subject who consciously sees a red ball in front of her in daylight. This experience has representational properties, it is of or about something, e.g. the red ball, and it has phenomenological properties, e.g. there is something it is like to see …
25th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP), University of Hertfordshire, 14th-17th August 2017. The deadline for submission of SYMPOSIA, PAPERS and POSTERS is 15th March. Online submission: via EasyChair Conference website – coming soon -: Keynote speakers: Susan Gelman (Psychology, Michigan) Elisabeth Pacherie (Philosophy, Institut …
A guiding idea of The Given is that the notion of mental content is essentially rooted in the notion of what is given in experience. In order for something to be given in experience it must be phenomenologically present in some manner or other. That is, everything that is given …
PhilMiLCog 2017 University of Western Ontario Graduate Conference in Philosophy of Mind, Language, and Cognitive Science Thursday June 15 to Saturday June 17 Keynote Speakers: Professor Barbara Gail Montero (Philosophy, City University of New York) Professor Gillian Barker (Philosophy, University of Western Ontario) + TBD (Brain and Mind Institute, University of Western Ontario) The Philosophy Department of the University of Western Ontario is …
To listen, go here.
I called my book The Given (Oxford University Press, 2016) because I set out to answer the question, What is given in experience? What does one have to do in order to give an adequate characterization of how the world is given to us, an adequate characterization of how we …
I want to pick up a thread from my second post, where I wrote that mindfulness practices should be understood as skillful ways of enacting certain kinds of embodied states and behaviors in the world, not as inner observation of an observer-independent mental stream. This point is especially important today, …
