Same-Order Theories and the Failure of Phenomenal Intimacy

Perusing the new issue of Philosophical Studies that came out I came across Chad Kidd’s paper Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation, which happens to be freely available on Phil Studies home page. The paper is interesting and aims to respond to the challenge raised by Josh Weisberg’s paper Same Old, Same Old: The …

Examples of successful conceivability arguments?

I’ve been reading over Chalmers’ conceivability/possibility arguments against materialist theories of mind. For those that don’t remember, his argument is: 1. We can conceive of zombies. 2. Conceivability implies logical possibility. 3. Therefore, zombies are logically possible. 4. If zombies are logically possible, then physicalism is false. 5. Therefore, physicalism …

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