By Hedda Hassel Mørch (See the other posts in this series here!) As Jonathan Birch points out, the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) is an outlier in the field of consciousness studies. Other major theories, such as the Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNW), are clearly compatible with materialism (i.e., …
By Jonathan Birch (See the other posts in this series here!) Part II: The integrated information theory as outlier Part I traced the gradual entry of consciousness into the Overton window of science. I suggested that the rise of computational theories of consciousness, such as the global neuronal workspace theory, …
By Jonathan Birch (See the other posts in this series here!) Part I: Cognitive neuroscience as usual? In politics, the ‘Overton window‘ is the range of positions that can safely raise their heads in public discourse. Propose something outside the window and you can expect resistance—not just to the proposal …
This week, Brains is pleased to welcome Jonathan Birch and Hedda Hassel Mørch, discussing the philosophy and science of consciousness. These posts were inspired by the recent Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness conference in New York, and we’re very happy to have Jonathan and Hedda contributing. There will …
Welcome to the Brains Blog’s Symposium series on the Cognitive Science of Philosophy. The aim of the series is to examine the use of diverse methods to generate philosophical insight. Each symposium is comprised of two parts. In the target post, a practitioner describes the method under discussion and explains …
The 1st Annual Web Conference of the International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind received many excellent submissions but decided to extend the deadline to allow even more submissions. Both individual submissions and symposia of up to five people are possible.
A central thesis of Cognitive Ontology is that cognitive kinds are unlikely to reduce to neural kinds. I found one of the most exciting threads in the book to be an argument supporting this anti-reductionistic thesis, which Khalidi summarizes in today’s post, and which I’ll call “the Individuation Argument.” According …
