As most of your know, the journal Synthese publishes a yearly issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy, edited by John Bickle. In recent years, this has been perhaps the highest profile venue explicitly devoted to articles in the philosophy of neuroscience. John kindly invited me to take over this editorial …
Any Brains readers in the New York area should consider themselves invited to the NYCC jam session on May 31st…for more info (and some fun videos and tunes) check out our facebook page….if you are in town come on down and have a drink with us or join in the …
I listened to the first lecture in David Chalmers’ Locke Lectures currently taking place at Oxford and I was intrigued by the argument he gave in defense of the claim that we can have a priori knowledge and do conceptual analysis even if we cannot give definitions of the concepts …
By Brandon Towl Some readers of Brains will be familiar with Kim’s causal exclusion argument. Roughly, the argument goes: 1) Every physical effect has a sufficient cause that is a physical cause. 2) Mental states (properties) are causes. 3) Mental states (properties) are realized by physical states (properties). 4) Mental …
Some of you might be interested by the symposium that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies on Doing without Concepts. Chris Hill (Brown, here) and Diana Raffman (Toronto, here) comment on the book, and I reply. Hugo Mercier IUPenn) has also a review in Biology and Philosophy.
By Jim Virtel On Friday April 30th and Saturday May 1st, the PNP Program at Washington University in St. Louis held a Concept Learning Workshop. Philosophers Richard Samuels, Daniel Weiskopf, and David Danks and psychologists Lance Rips, Lori Markson, and Susan Carey presented some of their recent, interesting work on …
A lot of philosophers seem to take the higher-order thought theory of consciousness to be eliminative or deflationary about consciousness; of course, it doesn’t help that people go around saying that we need to get rid of qualia or even that we should endorse the claim that we ourselves are …
