Philosopher’s Carnival #75
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Tips on Publishing in Graduate School
Yesterday I gave a little workshop about publishing to some graduate students (as part of Washington University’s Future Directions in Genetic Studies Graduate Training Workshop). Here is a list of tips:1. Make a personal web page. It’s the cheapest and easiest way to advertize yourself to the world. Post your …
Biorepresentations: necessary but not sufficient?
What follows is a working definition of how some people in neuroscience use the term ‘representation,’ and a brief examination of that usage.
Definition of biorepresentation:
A biorepresentation is an internal structure whose role is to carry information about what is happening in the world, a structure that is used by downstream processes to guide behavior with respect to those bits of the world that it carries information about.
cfp: The Terminator and Philosophy
Hi everyone! It’s been a while since I’ve posted here, as I have been trying to get Philosophy Sucks! off the ground (thanks to everyone who has come over and checked it out) and I am abivalent towards the practice of one author posting the same post on several blogs, …
Final CfP: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy
The deadline for the special issue of the European Review of Philosophy on Psychology and Experimental Philosophy is fast approaching. So, here is our last reminder. Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo, and Edouard Machery are editing a special issue of the European Review of Philosophy on Psychology and Experimental Philosophy. Our …
What’s New and Exciting About Computationalism?
I’m about to start writing a review article on “Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind,” for Philosophy Compass, due in two months. It should cover new and interesting stuff that pertains to computationalism. By “new”, I would say we should consider mostly literature from the last 15 years or so.Of course …
Specificity and Multiple Realization
Philosophers who wish to challenge the multiple realization of psychological properties sometimes suggest that it is more likely that a more general property, such as being in pain, is multiply realized than it is that a more specific property (of that general kind), such as human pain, is multiply …