Here.The carnival links to my previous post but contains a slight misunderstanding. I wasn’t trying to argue that “cognition is computation plus X”; rather, I was arguing that the most plausible version of computationalism is that cognition is computation plus X. I was being neutral on whether computationalism holds.
I just read a paper by Bob Gordon entitled “Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from Me to You” (in Mental Simulation, ed. M. Davies and T. Stone, Blackwell, 1996). Bob argues that introspection (looking inside your mind/perceiving your mental states/observing the qualitative aspect of your mental states) is unnecessary for mental state …
My book Mental Causation: The Mind/Body Problem is out and available (you can get the paper copy from Columbia University Press or Amazon or Barnes&Noble for about $23 USD). The book works its way up to a solution to a certain class of mental causation problems, roughly the ones picked …
There are less than three weeks left to submit your paper or symposium for the SSPP 2009.
Roughly speaking, computationalism is the view that cognition is computation. Although some form of computationalism has been mainstream in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind for decades, many people remain sceptical of it. Their reasons vary, but none of them amount to a refutation.In the philosophical literature, the most prominent objections to …
Here.
This might of interest for those readers who approach psychology and neuroscience from a philosophy of science perspective: The Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, announces two new postdoctoral fellowships for the academic year 2009-2010. Each fellowship includes a $40,000 stipend with benefits. Eligible candidates must be within …
