The expression “first-person data” has become quite common in the consciousness studied literature, where it is used to refer to data about conscious experience, sometimes with the implication that these data are obtained only through introspection, and sometimes with the further implication that these are private data (as opposed to …
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Next Spring, I’m teaching a course on mechanisms (mechanistic explanation) and functions (functional explanation). I’m considering some of the following sources: The Monist, 87.1 (2004). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37.1 (2006). Allen, C., M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder, Eds. (1998). Nature’s Purposes: Analysis of Function and Design …
Apparently, famous identity-theorist U.T. Place’s brain is preserved at University of Adelaide. See here. You’ll notice that it’s left hemisphere (right facing you) is huge compared to it’s right. Is this some evidence for the old logic and language in the left-brain idea (assuming Place was quite logical–and perhaps not …
Traditionally, many philosophers like to attribute special status to at least some kinds of knowledge that we have of our minds. The purported reliability of introspection is often invoked by those who propose to construct a first-person science–a science based on private evidence delivered through introspection. Even Daniel Dennett, a naturalist …
In the recent thread, the issue of modularity was discussed. Anibal wrote the following: “My humble view is that the brain is a brilliant plastic and distributed machine using one single module to more than one cognitive function and viceversa.”This reminded me of some recent, interesting work along these lines …
