The Unreliability of Introspection

Traditionally, many philosophers like to attribute special status to at least some kinds of knowledge that we have of our minds.  The purported reliability of introspection is often invoked by those who propose to construct a first-person science–a science based on private evidence delivered through introspection.  Even Daniel Dennett, a naturalist …

Do cognitive neuroscientist really think…

Dear virtual community,   This may be a really stupid question, but I am obsessed. Couple of weeks ago a lecturer asked me in a lecture: ”A-M,  do cognitive (neuro)scientists really think that the female and male brains are different?” I said: “Yes, pretty much so. The empirical – for example anatomical  – …

NIPS 2006 Workshop: Decoding the Neural Code

There is great interest in sensory coding. Studies of sensory coding typically involve recording from sensory neurons during stimulus presentation, and the investigators determine which aspects of the neuronal response are most informative about the stimulus. These studies are left with a decoding problem: are the discovered codes, sometimes quite exotic, ultimately used by the nervous system to guide behavior? In our one-day workshop, researchers with many different backgrounds will evaluate what we know about neuronal decoders and suggest new strategies, both experimental and computational, for addressing the decoding problem.

Course on Consciousness

Next spring, I’m teaching a cross-listed upper undergraduate/graduate course on consciousness for the first time.  I’d like to strike a good balance between philosophical and scientific readings.  Does anyone have suggestions as to what is a must-read in the huge literature on consciousness?  From an informal survey, it seems to me …

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