Revonsuo’s Inner Presence

Antti Revonsuo, Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon, MIT Press, 2006.If you are wondering who Revonsuo is, he is a neuroscientist from Finland. I haven’t read his new book but from the table of contents, it looks like a serious reflection on consciousness from a cognitive neuroscience and neurophysiology …

Upcoming Conference Deadlines

Some calls for papers of interest to philosophers of mind, psychology, and neuroscience:February 15 Eastern APAMarch 1 Society for Philosophy and PsychologyMarch 15 International Society for Research on Emotions—2006 Computing and Philosophy conferencesEuropean-CAP 2006 Conference22-24 June, 2006****February 3, 2006*** Submission of extended abstractsHosted by the Dragvoll campus of the Norwegian …

Some General Purpose Philosophical Listservs

I was recently asked which general purpose listservs in philosophy is worth subscribing to. I subscribe to the following three, which strike me as reasonably useful so far:https://www.louisiana.edu/Academic/LiberalArts/PHIL/philosop.htmlhttps://www.lsoft.com/scripts/wl.exe?SL1=PHILOS-L&H=LISTSERV.LIV.AC.UKhttps://www.disputatio.com/esap-news/

Why the Zombie Conceivability Argument Is Unsound

Perhaps the currently most popular and discussed objection to physicalism is the zombie conceivability argument, whose most famous proponent is David Chalmers. In a nutshell, the argument goes as follows: zombies are conceivable, if zombies are conceivable then zombies are possible, and if zombies are possible, then physicalism is false; …

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