I recently developed a novel paradox involving a variety of representational states and activities, and I am wondering if readers might have any thoughts about my ideas here. To illustrate the paradox, I first prove that there are certain contingently true propositions that no one can occurrently believe. Then, I …
In Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley (2005) provides a number of examples to show that propositional knowledge is not gradable. Consider the following two sentences: (a1) Sean knows that Obama is President better than Meredith does. (a2) Alyssa knows that Obama is President better than Philip knows that Clinton …
For those interested, Eric Schwitzgebel and I have been exploring the relationship between knowledge ascriptions and belief ascriptions. We just finished a draft on this topic, which can be found here. Abstract: The standard view in contemporary epistemology is that knowledge entails belief. Proponents of this claim rarely offer a …
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Over the past two months, I’ve used a series of surveys to examine the relationship between the concept of knowledge and the concept of belief. So far, the results suggest that many people have intuitions which are in opposition to the claim that knowledge is a species of belief. For …
