Which Theory of Mind? – And other questions

In my final post I would like to wrap up by sketching some of the implications of my proposal – in particular concerning our theorizing about social cognition – as well as raising some questions that are being left open. There exists quite a large controversy in philosophy and psychology …

Self and Others

To provide a full account of the ability to think “I”-thoughts, we need an explanation of the transition from implicitly self-related information to explicit self-representation. In the previous post, I argued that world-directed action and perception do not require explicit self-representation. This raises the question of when explicit self-representation does …

Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness?

Recently, there have been several attempts to provide an account of our ability for self-conscious thought in terms of nonconceptual forms of (self-)representation (most prominent among these is perhaps the account offered by Bermúdez (1998)). Proponents of nonconceptual content assume that there are ways of representing the world that are …

Setting the Stage: The Problem of Self-Consciousness

Many thanks to John for inviting me to blog about my book, Thinking about Oneself, this week. The book is concerned with self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. A paradigmatic expression of this ability is the ability to think “I”-thoughts (as in the thought “I am hungry”, …

Early Career Fellowships in the Philosophy of Primate Cognition

The Centre for Advanced Studies in Göttingen, the Lichtenberg-Kolleg, invites applications for Early Career Fellowships for the period from October 2015 to July 2017 in a group of philosophers working on conceptual and foundational issues concerning primate cognition. The group will be closely related to a newly established research cluster …

Upcoming events at Brains

Now that summer is nearing its end, activities at the blog will be picking up again. In addition to the upcoming symposium on Wayne Wu’s article, “Against Division: Consciousness, Information and the Visual Streams”, from the September 2014 issue of Mind & Language (with commentaries by David Kaplan, Pete Mandik, and …

Call for Abstracts: Workshop on Minimal Mindreading, University of Magdeburg, November 6-8, 2014

Classical explanations of social cognition assume that complex social interaction involves social understanding and that social understanding in turn depends on the ability to read others’ minds, i.e. on the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs and desires, to others for the purposes of predicting and explaining their …

CFP: What is cognition?

Workshop on “What is cognition?” in Bochum, June 27-29, 2013 The workshop invites contributions exploring any and all issues that can move us toward an answer to the question, “what is cognition?”. Contributions are welcome to address a particular view already championed in the literature or bring forward original suggestions …