4. The Negative Semantic Argument

It is important to realize that first-personal phenomenal consciousness is all-or-nothing. Any given mental state is either phenomenally conscious or it isn’t. It makes no sense to talk of degrees of phenomenal consciousness, or partial phenomenal consciousness. This is another place where some of the distinctions drawn in Monday’s post …

A Couple of Venues

Just a quick reminder about two venues for good work in the philosophy of neuroscience: Synthese used to publish a yearly Special Issue in the philosophy of neuroscience. The format has changed slightly, in that the papers are now published as they are accepted, but they are collected together online …

CFP: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Locating Representations in the Brain, Synthese Topical Collection

We’re pleased to announce a call for papers for a Synthese Topical Collection* on Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Locating Representations in the Brain Guest Editors: Sarah Robins (University of Kansas) and Jessey Wright (Stanford University). The concept of ‘representation’ has become ubiquitous in neuroscience, especially in light of recent advances in …

Symposium on Michel and Morales, “Minority Reports: Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex”

I’m very pleased to announce our latest Mind & Language symposium on Matthias Michel and Jorge Morales’ forthcoming “Minority Reports: Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex.” Our outstanding commentators on the target article include Liz Irvine (Cardiff), Benjamin Kozuch (Alabama), and Michael Pitts with Kevin Ortego (Reed College). 

JOB: Tulane University

The Tulane University Philosophy Department is hiring a Professor of Practice in the area of Asian Philosophy/Buddhism, with an AOC in the Philosophy of Mind.  Professors of practice are non-tenure track but continuing positions with full benefits, and with opportunities for long-term employment and increases in compensation.  Professors of practice …

2. Specifying Self-Structures

The Structural Realist theory of the Self (SRS) is presented as an extension of structural realism in the philosophy of many-particle physics. Structural realism addresses the problem of conflicting ontological consequences with regards to the existence of individual objects at the sub-particle level by making commitments to commonalities. In the …

1. Structuring the Self, a new metaphysical enterprise

As before, I am very grateful to John for letting me present my work. My new book Structuring the Self (2019, Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science), did not initially aim to introduce a new insight into the nature of selfhood so much as to give …

Now Featured

We are grateful to Majid Davoody Beni for blogging this week on Structuring the Self, newly published by Palgrave Macmillan in the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science series. To view all of Majid’s posts on a single page, please click here.