Factive verbs and factive mental states

My last post went back to babies, to see if the dawn of mental state attribution might show us something about the relationship between knowledge and belief.  Even for those who take the concept of belief to be innate or very early-developing, belief attribution is weirdly dependent on knowledge attribution …

Talking about knowing

I’m surprised to find myself here. I started out in philosophy as a very old-fashioned epistemologist, concerned with the question of how necessary truths are known, and I think there was a whole chapter in my thesis arguing against naturalist approaches. For what it’s worth, I’m still a sworn enemy …

Symposium on Boyd Millar’s “Naïve Realism and Illusion”

I’m pleased to introduce our second Ergo symposium, featuring Boyd Millar’s “Naïve Realism and Illusion” with commentaries by Craig French (Cambridge) and James Genone (Rutgers). Thanks to each of the participants for their excellent work and to John Schwenkler for helping me put the symposium together.

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