The Man Behind the Legend
3:AM Magazine‘s Richard Marshall interviews our own Pete Mandik.
Author: John Schwenkler
i-Comment (and you can, too!)
I’m happy to announce that my criticism of Held et al.’s 2011 paper on Molyneux’s question, which began as a post here at Brains, appeared today in a short paper in i-Perception. The core of my argument is the same as before, though now I draw on a wider range …
Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind
Inspired by Trent Dougherty’s efforts at Certain Doubts to compile a list of women working in epistemology, Carolyn, Brit, and I have spent some time doing the same for the philosophy of mind. Let me quote Trent’s justification for such a project: I suspect that one of the most common …
What has feminism to do with the philosophy of mind?
One thing I gathered from the responses to my survey on the climate for women in philosophy of mind is that many people lack a clear answer to the question asked by the title of this post. This is significant, because four of Rebecca Kukla’s seven criteria for woman-friendliness had …
On the Climate for Women in Phil. of Mind: A First Look at the Survey Data
I’ve gotten about 30 responses to the survey I posted last week, and as I begin to look through the data (this takes a while, as I have to enter them into an Excel spreadsheet in order to break them down), some interesting trends have emerged. In this post I’ll …
How is the climate for women in empirically-informed philosophy of mind?
Guest-blogging at Leiter Reports, Rebecca Kukla identifies the following criteria as necessary for a philosophical sub-discipline to be truly woman-friendly: (1) There are a sizable number of leaders and up-and-coming stars in the field who are women, regardless of whether they take up feminist issues, and (2) it has a …
Williamson on Naturalism
I’d be interested in hearing what our readers think of Timothy Williamson’s case against naturalism in this post at the NYT’s Stone blog (H/T NewApps). As I read it, his argument has the form of a dilemma. There are, he supposes, two ways that the thesis of naturalism can be …