What kind of evidence is phenomenological evidence?

Recently there has been a lot of interesting work (including some by one of our own) done on the epistemic status of first-personal reports on conscious states. The usual target in this tradition is the assumption of a certain kind of first-person authority concerning what consciousness is like for someone …

A Summary of the Imperative Content Strategy

By Manolo Martinez In my last post I was assuming familiarity with something not many people is familiar with. I apologise. Let me say a quick thing about the imperative content strategy to defend representationalism about pain. Before that, representationalism: this is the idea that the phenomenal character of experiences …

The Identity Theory and Mind-Brain Correlations

By Brandon Towl In another thread (“What’s a good reading against type-identity theory for neuroscientists?”), I mentioned that I had a forthcoming paper in Philosophical Psychology that puts pressure on the IBE argument for identity theory.  Below is the abstract.  If anyone would like a draft of the paper, please …

Draft paper: "Multiple Realizability without Multiply Realizable Properties"

By Brandon Towl Hello again Brains readers– I’m turning to you again for your help and insights. Here is a link to a draft of a paper I am working on tentatively entitled “Multiple Realizability without Multiply Realizable Properties”.  I’d appreciate any feedback or comments on it from interested parties. …

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