I am very pleased to contribute to this symposium on Causation with a Human Face (CHF). My commentary concerns chapter 6 of CHF, which uses the notion of invariance to shed light on various puzzle cases about causation. (See Jim’s post “Invariance and Distinctions Within Causation” for a summary of …
As explained in the previous post, one very rich area of inquiry concerns the extent to which normative theories of causal reasoning, from both philosophy and elsewhere, successfully characterize how, as an empirical matter, various sorts of subjects (adults, children, non-human animals) reason. This has been explored by psychologists and other researchers …
How should philosophers (and others) approach the topic of causation and causal reasoning? Causation with a Human Face (CHF) proposes an approach that brings together results from a number of different disciplines, both descriptive ( e.g., the empirical psychology of causal cognition) and normative (statistics, econometrics, machine learning, philosophy). The guiding idea is that causal …
We are grateful to be able to share out latest symposium this week on James Woodward‘s new book, Causation With A Human Face. We also have fantastic commentators: Josh Knobe, Patricia Cheng, Christopher Hitchcock, Thomas Blanchard, and David Kinney, and Tania Lombrozo. You can read all of the posts here …
The next Neural Mechanisms webinar is Friday (22nd) 8-10 Greenwich Mean Time: Karen YAN (National Yang-Ming University) presents “Evaluating the Success of Causal Investigative Strategies in Neurophysiology”. Find out about the paper and how to join the webinar in this post.
In the previous post I presented the main arguments against the method of cases developed in Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. Various objections can be raised against this argument, some of which have already been put in print. Chapter 5 addresses 8 objections: I defend the experimental quality of the research …
In the previous post, I argued for a minimalist characterization of the method of cases, which I share with some of the most well-known critics of experimental philosophy. In this post, I want to present the two arguments against the method of cases, developed in Chapter 3 and 4 of …
