The Ontology of Creature Consciousness

In a previous post, I asked whether creature consciousness might be ontologically more important, including as part of the ontological basis for phenomenal consciousness, than many philosophers seem to think.  I was motivated in part by “Consciousness without a Cerebrain Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and Medicine,” a forthcoming BBS target article …

Consciousness and the Brainstem

I am under the impression that philosophers who talk about consciousness by and large focus on state consciousness and neglect creature consciousness, perhaps because they think that creature consciousness reduces to (is analyzable in terms of) state consciousness, or at any rate state consciousness is the ontologically more fundamental notion.  …

Gelertner, Kurzweil, and Copeland Video

Corey Maley sent me “a link to a webcast of a debate between David Gelerntner and Ray Kurzweil on machine consciousness. Perhaps a bit more interesting is a talk by Jack Copeland on Turing’s contribution to codebreaking and to the development of AI (which starts at about the 1 hour 45 minute mark).”

Imageless Thought

The standard story about the demise of introspectionist psychology goes something like this:  Towards the beginning of the 20th Century, experimental psychologists relied on introspecting subjects to study the mind.  Members of one prominent school believed that each thought is reducible to sensory images (visual, auditory including verbal, proprioceptive, etc.).  Among …

A Note on Heterophenomenology

In comments to some previous posts, Marcin Milkowski raised a spirited defense of Dennett’s heterophenomenology (HF) as a correct methodology of data from first-person reports (about mental states).  Among other statements, he made the following:   “HF is not about inferring beliefs from verbal behavior in any setting.  It’s about …

Back to Top