Philosophers, both at Brains and elsewhere in the philosophical blogosphere, seem to like participating in and reading polls, so how about another one here? Is the property of having dichromatic color vision multiply realized in humans? If so, why? If not, why not I say “yes”. There are three familiar …
We are very happy to announce a new group, the ‘Society for the Metaphysics of Science’, (unsurprisingly) devoted to the ‘metaphysics of science’. We would like to invite anyone interested to join the group and also to attend our upcoming sessions at the Pacific and Central APA Conferences. The website …
Following their discussion of the Inga-Otto thought experiment, Andy Clark and David Chalmers propose the following necessary and sufficient conditions for what information is to be a part of one’s cognitive apparatus: First, the notebook is a constant in Otto’s life – in cases where the information in the notebook …
In a previous post, I asked whether creature consciousness might be ontologically more important, including as part of the ontological basis for phenomenal consciousness, than many philosophers seem to think. I was motivated in part by “Consciousness without a Cerebrain Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and Medicine,” a forthcoming BBS target article …
There is a review of contemporary debates about free will in the NYT of two days ago. The author gets a bit mixed up on freedom vs. unpredictability, but this is as far as an intelligent science writer has gotten so far by interviewing a bunch of scientists and philosophers.
A few days ago, I asked whether the mind is in the head. Counting only reasonably unambiguous answers (and counting one vote per commenter), as of right now Brains readers answered as follows:Yes: 11 votesNo: 6 votesUpdate: You may find some more comments here and here.
