What kind of evidence is phenomenological evidence?

Recently there has been a lot of interesting work (including some by one of our own) done on the epistemic status of first-personal reports on conscious states. The usual target in this tradition is the assumption of a certain kind of first-person authority concerning what consciousness is like for someone …

The Identity Theory and Mind-Brain Correlations

By Brandon Towl In another thread (“What’s a good reading against type-identity theory for neuroscientists?”), I mentioned that I had a forthcoming paper in Philosophical Psychology that puts pressure on the IBE argument for identity theory.  Below is the abstract.  If anyone would like a draft of the paper, please …

A Dialogue with Brit Brogaard on Philosophy and Neuroscience

My great colleague Brit Brogaard has recently started doing empirical research, primarily in cognitive neuroscience.  This prompted the following dialogue, which will eventually be published in our department’s newsletter. Gualtiero: Until recently, you were known for armchair philosophizing and not at all for empirical research.  Could you briefly explain how you became …

Classicists between Wishful Thinking and Neuroscience

At the recent meeting of the Pacific APA, I had an interesting conversation with a prominent philosopher of science who also does some work in cognitive science.  We were talking about whether neuroscience and psychology contrain each other.  I was arguing that they do.  He suggested that perhaps the only …

Challenging Neuroscience to Explain Cognition

C, R, Gallistel and A. P. King, Memory and the Computational Brain: Why Cognitive Science Will Transform Neuroscience, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. This is a rich and thought-provoking book.  I cannot do it justice in a brief post so I apologize in advance for that. Roughly speaking, the book argues that (1) many …

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