It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the history of the Phenomenological tradition is a history of the various interpretations and perceived significance of the concept of intentionality. Brought to prominence by Brentano, elaborated by Husserl, employed and modified in various ways by Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, intentionality …
CFP for BPPA Masterclass on Naïve Realism and Its Challenges At the University of Warwick, on the 8th of October 2016; Room TBC The deadline for submitting your work is the 1st of September 2016. Until recently, the idea that perceptual experiences are representational states was dominant, if not unquestioned. …
I’m pleased to introduce our second Ergo symposium, featuring Boyd Millar’s “Naïve Realism and Illusion” with commentaries by Craig French (Cambridge) and James Genone (Rutgers). Thanks to each of the participants for their excellent work and to John Schwenkler for helping me put the symposium together.
Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my new book Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind (Oxford University Press NY, 2016). In the previous post, I spoke about the emerging view of the perceiving brain as a prediction machine. Brains like that are …
Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my new book Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind (Oxford University Press NY, 2016).
The argument from fineness of grain is probably the most discussed argument for nonconceptualism. (To name but a few discussants: Peacocke 1998, 2001a, 2001b; McDowell 1994, 1998, Brewer 1999, 2005, Tye 2005, Coliva 2003, Kelly 2001a, 2001b, Veillet 2014.) To account for the fine-grained phenomenal character of visual experience in …
In my previous post, I referred several times to the state view/content view distinction. As has been argued by authors such as Byrne (2005) or Crowther (2006), the distinction is problematic for nonconceptualists to the extent that they want to make a claim about perceptual content. For central pro-nonconceptualist arguments …
