A series of blog posts featuring scholars in the philosophy and science of mind.
In my previous post I suggested that the epistemic faults listed in most definitions of delusions are not distinctive of delusions. Although delusions may diverge from norms of rationality to a greater extent than non-delusional beliefs, they are irrational in no special way. Excessively positive beliefs about ourselves, and widespread …
First of all, my thanks to John for a very generous introduction. I’m glad to be blogging on Brains when I’m about to start a brand new project. Come September, I’ll be on an AHRC Fellowship exploring the possibility that, in some contexts, cognitions with obvious epistemic pitfalls (such as …
I’m honored to be able to introduce Lisa Bortolotti, currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham, as the first philosopher to discuss her work as a featured scholar here at Brains.
