There is a standard story about the emergence of the identity theory. Namely, before (say) 1956, because the concept of an experience was not synonymous with the concept of a brain state, we knew a priori that experiences could not be brain states. Let’s call this the semantic argument against …
On Friday I attended Pete Mandik’s Cogsci talk at CUNY. The talk was excellent; entertaining and with a spirited discussion of many interesting topics. This paper represents one of a two part project that Pete is pursuing that involves Swamp Mary. One project employs Swamp Mary against dualists while the …
POSITION: Tenure stream assistant professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, pending budgetary approval. Area of Specialization: History and philosophy of science and related areas that naturally complement departmental strengths. We have interest in strengthening areas of history and philosophy of neuroscience, physics, and general methodology. Rank: …
Please post and distribute widely; apologies for cross-posting. I am pleased to announce the call for papers for the third online consciousness conference. Invited speakers include, Kathleen Akins, Simon Fraser University Paul Churchland, University of California San Diego Steven Harnad, University of South Hampton Jesse Prinz, The Graduate Center, CUNY Papers in …
Below is a CFP that may be of interest to Brains readers. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES CALL FOR PAPERS SPECIAL ISSUE: DEBATES ON EMBODIED SOCIAL COGNITION SPECIAL EDITOR: SHANNON SPAULDING Rationale: Embodied Cognition (EC) is a research program that challenges the basic tenets of Cognitivism, the standard position in …
Here .
The following post is a bit of a rant, written in the tradition of the angry bloggers of yore…
The first part discusses Scholarpedia’s section on consciousness. The second part is a dialogue I overheard on higher-order theories of consciousness.
