Cross-Posted @ Philosophy Sucks! While I was perusing the new entries over at PhilPapers yesterday I came across Tom Polger‘s forthcoming paper inPhilosophical Psychology Are Sensations Still Brain Processes? The paper is very interesting (disclaimer: I have a special interest in this stuff; see for instance The Identity Theory in 2-D) and I thought I would …
Dialogue will publish soon the symposium on Doing without Concepts with Tania Lombrozo’s, Pierre Poirier’s and our own Gualtiero’s papers. (Gualtiero’s paper was posted on this blog earlier and was followed by a lively exchange.) The three papers are really excellent and worth reading. My reply is
Some of you might be interested by Kim Sterelny’s essay on the evolution of humans and by the commentaries on his essay (C. Driscoll, P.S. Davies, mine, etc.). It’s a good summary of Kim’s views. The symposium is organized by C. Driscoll on the forum On the Human. Edouard
Here .
This website was just brought to my attention. It is the Journal of Visualized Experiments (JoVE), an “online research journal employing visualization to increase reproducibility and transparency in biological sciences”. It’s interesting and potentially quite useful. Does anyone have any thoughts on it?
I am writing a thesis on the possibility of machine consciousness (e.g., the possibility of creating a silicon-based system that has subjective, qualitative experiences in the same way we take ourselves to have them). In my informal (and very limited) polling, it seems that many philosophers are sympathetic to the …
In a previous thread, Ken Aizawa suggests that I’m insufficiently pluralistic about computation in cognitive science and to substantiate his criticism he points to his forthcoming article “Computation in Cognitive Systems; It’s not al about Turing-Equivalent Computation” (available on his website). Having read Ken’s nice paper, I only have time …
