By: Will Bridewell, Naval Research Laboratory Alistair M.C. Isaac, University of Edinburgh (View all posts in this series here.) In part 1, we motivated an apophatic methodology for the science of consciousness. The basic idea was to take a model’s success at reproducing some set of consciousness-relevant phenomena as negative …
By: Will Bridewell, Naval Research Laboratory Alistair M.C. Isaac, University of Edinburgh (View all posts in this series here.) What can computational models tell us about consciousness? Traditionally, the computational study of consciousness has been linked to metaphysical theories that reduce conscious states to their functional role. In a recent …
We are excited to have a great set of posts this week focusing on computational modeling and consciousness! We will begin with two posts by Will Bridewell and Alistair Isaac, outlining their “apophatic” approach to modeling consciousness. We’ll then have two commentaries, one by Matthias Michel and another by Marta …
By Tillman Vierkant, University of Edinburgh (See all the posts in this series here.) I am very grateful to Gloria Andrada, Paulius Rimkevicius and Ting Huang for their very insightful comments. I hope that my replies will help to clarify some of the issues raised and stimulate further discussion. Let …
By Ting Huang (See all posts in this series here.) In a prior symposium on the book I posed the following clarifying questions to Vierkant regarding his stance on free will: Does “managerial control” provide basis for moral responsibility? In line with Holton’s conception of choice, what role does consciousness …
By Paulius Rimkevicius, Chapman University (See all posts in this series here.) Like a tinker, who travels freely from place to place mending metal utensils and sometimes ends up creating quite an extraordinary-looking gadget out of the simple old things that he finds, a philosopher who is well-versed in more …
By Gloria Andrada, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. (See all the posts in this series here.) One of my favorite things about Vierkant’s book is that it provides an original argument for extended cognition, one that begins with the role of intentional action in epistemic agency. This makes it really interesting …
