Computational Modeling and Consciousness: Commentary on Bridewell and Isaac

By Matthias Michel, Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, New York University (View all the posts in this series here.) Bridewell & Isaac’s idea is ‘refutation by implementation.’ If a model implements a theory of consciousness, that theory is wrong: “the ability to encode the core principles of a theory …

Computational Modeling and Consciousness: AI — Science of a Moving Target

By: Will Bridewell, Naval Research Laboratory Alistair M.C. Isaac, University of Edinburgh (View all posts in this series here.) In part 1, we motivated an apophatic methodology for the science of consciousness.  The basic idea was to take a model’s success at reproducing some set of consciousness-relevant phenomena as negative …

Computational Modeling and Consciousness: Consciousness Science without the Metaphysics

By: Will Bridewell, Naval Research Laboratory Alistair M.C. Isaac, University of Edinburgh (View all posts in this series here.) What can computational models tell us about consciousness? Traditionally, the computational study of consciousness has been linked to metaphysical theories that reduce conscious states to their functional role. In a recent …

This Week: Computational Modeling and Consciousness

We are excited to have a great set of posts this week focusing on computational modeling and consciousness! We will begin with two posts by Will Bridewell and Alistair Isaac, outlining their “apophatic” approach to modeling consciousness. We’ll then have two commentaries, one by Matthias Michel and another by Marta …

Vierkant: Response to Commentaries

By Tillman Vierkant, University of Edinburgh (See all the posts in this series here.) I am very grateful to Gloria Andrada, Paulius Rimkevicius and Ting Huang for their very insightful comments. I hope that my replies will help to clarify some of the issues raised and stimulate further discussion. Let …

The Tinkering Mind against Free Will – Commentary on “The Tinkering Mind”

By Ting Huang (See all posts in this series here.) In a prior symposium on the book I posed the following clarifying questions to Vierkant regarding his stance on free will: Does “managerial control” provide basis for moral responsibility? In line with Holton’s conception of choice, what role does consciousness …

Freedom of a Tinker: Comments on Tillmann Vierkant’s The Tinkering Mind

By Paulius Rimkevicius, Chapman University (See all posts in this series here.) Like a tinker, who travels freely from place to place mending metal utensils and sometimes ends up creating quite an extraordinary-looking gadget out of the simple old things that he finds, a philosopher who is well-versed in more …

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