I just read a paper by Bob Gordon entitled “Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from Me to You” (in Mental Simulation, ed. M. Davies and T. Stone, Blackwell, 1996). Bob argues that introspection (looking inside your mind/perceiving your mental states/observing the qualitative aspect of your mental states) is unnecessary for mental state …
My book Mental Causation: The Mind/Body Problem is out and available (you can get the paper copy from Columbia University Press or Amazon or Barnes&Noble for about $23 USD). The book works its way up to a solution to a certain class of mental causation problems, roughly the ones picked …
There are less than three weeks left to submit your paper or symposium for the SSPP 2009.
Roughly speaking, computationalism is the view that cognition is computation. Although some form of computationalism has been mainstream in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind for decades, many people remain sceptical of it. Their reasons vary, but none of them amount to a refutation.In the philosophical literature, the most prominent objections to …
Here.
This might of interest for those readers who approach psychology and neuroscience from a philosophy of science perspective: The Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, announces two new postdoctoral fellowships for the academic year 2009-2010. Each fellowship includes a $40,000 stipend with benefits. Eligible candidates must be within …
Fiery Cushman and Eric Schwitzgebel are running a new version of the “Moral Sense Test”, which asks respondents to make moral judgments about hypothetical scenarios. They’re especially hoping to recruit people with philosophy degrees for this test so that they can compare philosophers’ and non-philosophers’ responses.The test should take about 15-20 minutes.Here’s …
