4. The Technical View, and Summing Up

In the previous post I articulated Literalism to a degree. In the book I articulate it further by responding to a series of objections, at least some of which have no doubt occurred to you. Since these are likely to be raised in comments, in this post I will present …

CFP: New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience

Neural Mechanisms Web Conference New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience October 5th, 10 – 18 (Greenwich Mean Time)   In recent years, cognitive neuroscience has made several leaps forward: new discoveries have been made (e.g. the resting state networks or the increased scope of neural plasticity), prompting new questions; new …

3. Literalism (Expanded Somewhat)

Anthropocentric tradition holds that the (somewhat idealized) human case is the standard for what counts as a real instance of a psychological capacity. But even if we learn about minds from the human case, it does not follow that humans are the standard for objectively correct ascriptions. For the Literalist, …

Symposium on Joshua Shepherd’s “Halfhearted Action and Control”

Welcome to our fifth Ergo symposium. This week we are showcasing Joshua Shepherd’s paper “Halfhearted Action and Control”, with commentaries by Andreas Elpidorou (Louisville), Nora Heinzelmann (Munich), and Zachary Irving (Virginia). Let me begin by thanking all the participants for their great work! Shepherd introduces his topic with a possibly familiar …

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